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Abstract
Informal settlements often emerge, due to rapid urbanisation or failure of urban systems, 
with negative resultant effects. Such settlements are viewed as a blight to the beauty 
and order of modern cities, attracting demolition threats from local authorities. Despite 
the use of force through demolitions and evictions, a number of these settlements 
have grown to a point where many have attracted upgrading initiatives rather than 
demolition. Hence, they have become permanent features of the vast majority of 
cities in the Global South. This study poses the question: How do these settlements 
transcend serious threats to their existence and still consolidate and grow? The study 
found that the answer lies in their adaptive resistance capacity. As settlements resist 
eviction, they also adapt rules from formal systems, in order to minimise their negative 
image. As a result, with time, conditions improve within the settlements. The study 
used Mindolo North informal settlement in the city of Kitwe as a case study to examine 
mechanisms through which informal settlements emerge, consolidate and grow.
Keywords: Adaptive, resistance, informal settlements, planning, Zambia
AANPASBARE WEERSTAND TE MIDDE VAN BEPLANNING EN 
ADMINISTRATIEWE MISLUKKING: DIE VERHAAL VAN ‘N INFORMELE 
NEDERSETTING IN DIE STAD KITWE, ZAMBIË
Informele nedersettings kom dikwels voor as gevolg van vinnige verstedeliking of 
die mislukking van stedelike stelsels, met negatiewe gevolge. Sulke nedersettings 
word gesien as ’n problem vir die skoonheid en orde van moderne stede, en lok 
slopingsdreigemente vanaf plaaslike owerhede. Ten spyte van die gebruik van 
geweld deur sloping en uitsettings, het ’n aantal van hierdie nedersettings gegroei tot 
’n punt waar baie opgraderingsinisiatiewe eerder as sloop gelok het. Hulle word dus 
permanente kenmerke van die meeste stede in die Globale Suide. Hierdie studie vra: 
Hoe oortref hierdie nedersettings ernstige bedreigings vir hul bestaan, en konsolideer 
en groei hulle nog steeds? Die studie het bevind dat die antwoord in hul aanpasbare 
weerstandskapasiteit lê. Aangesien nedersettings die uitsetting weerstaan, pas hulle ook 
reëls van formele stelsels aan om hul negatiewe beeld te verminder. As gevolg hiervan 
verbeter toestande binne die nedersettings mettertyd. Die studie gebruik Mindolo Noord 
informele nedersetting in die stad Kitwe as gevallestudie om meganismes te ondersoek 
waardeur informele nedersettings ontstaan, konsolideer en groei.
Sleutelwoorde: Aanpasbaar, weerstand, informele nedersettings, beplanning, Zambië
KHANYETSO EA PHETOHO 
NAKONG EA HO HLOLEHA HOA 
THERO LE TSAMAISO: PALE EA 
MOTSE OA BAIPEHI TOROPONG 
EA KITWE, ZAMBIA
Metse ea baipehi e tlisoa ke kho’lo ea 
libaka tse mabalane kapa ho se atlehe 
hoa tsamaiso ea ntlafatso ea litotopo. 
Metse ena e nkoa e senya bokhabane 
le botle ba litoropo tsa kajeno, ‘me hona 
ho susumetsa baetapele ho lohotha 
ho senya metse ena ea baipehi, kapa 
hona ho leleka baahi ba eona. E meng 
ea metse ena e holile haholo hoo ho 
bang thata ho e senya kapa ho leleka 
baahi ba eona, mme qetelong baetapele 
ba e ntlafatsa, ‘me kahona eba metse 
e tsepameng litoropong tse ngata 
selikalikoeng se ka Borwa. Potso ea 
manthla ea boithuto bona e bile hore na 
ke eng e susumetsang metse ea baipehi 
ho hola le ha hona le litshoso tsa ho e 
senya? Karabo e fumanoeng ke hore 
baahi ba metse ena ba na le bokgoni ba 
ho fetola khanyetso. Ke hore, ha baahi 
ba loanela ho se lelekoe, ba sebelisa 
melao e teng ea lefatshe, mme sena se 
thusa hore metse ea bona ebe le seriti. 
Ka lebaka lena, ha nako e ntse e ea, 
maemo a metse ea baipehi a fetoha. 
Boithuto bona bo entsoe motseng oa 
baipehi oa Mindolo, toropong ea Kitwe, 
molemong oa ho lekola lisusumetso tse 
tlisang motheo, kopa-kopano le kgolo 
ea metse ea baipehi.
1. INTRODUCTION
Stories of the emergence, 
consolidation and growth of informal 
settlements take many forms in 
the Global South. Despite each of 
these settlements having its own 
unique history, literature ascribes 
their existence either to rapid 
urbanisation or to failure of urban 
systems, particularly planning 
failure (United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe [UNECE], 
2009; Sori, 2012; UN Habitat, 2015; 
Masimba, 2016; Sakala, 2016; 
Marutlulle, 2017). Viewed mostly as 
a blight on the beauty and order of 
modern cities, informal settlements 
are often regarded as a disease to be 
eradicated. As a result, a number of 
studies are titled ‘causes of informal 
settlements’ (see, for instance, Ali 
& Sulaiman, 2006; UNECE, 2009; 
UN Habitat, 2015; Masimba, 2016; 
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Sakala, 2016; Marutlulle, 2017). 
The major causes cited in these 
studies include population growth, 
rapid urbanisation, poverty, rural-
urban migration, lack of access 
to land and ownership, and weak 
urban governance (in terms of 
policy, planning and land/urban 
management). Growth of informal 
settlements is then said to cause a 
number of socio-economic problems 
such as pollution, deforestation, 
flooding, and wastage of agricultural 
land (Ali & Sulaiman, 2006: 1).
However, besides failure by local 
authorities to cope with rapid 
urbanisation, a number of other 
studies point to informal settlers’ 
resistance and ability to adapt as 
reasons for the existence of the vast 
majority of informal settlements. 
For instance, Skuse and Cousins 
(2007: 979) framed ‘resistance’ as 
the ‘struggle’ for urban permanency. 
The study used the settlement of 
Nkanini in Cape Town to examine 
the “bitter struggle between residents 
and local City of Cape Town 
authorities over claims to occupy the 
land” (Skuse & Cousins, 2007: 979). 
Fitchett (2014: 355) used a 
similar concept called ‘adaptive 
co-management’ to argue for the 
appreciation of local knowledge 
systems and social structures 
when confronting challenges of 
informal settlements. The study used 
Diepsloot, an informal settlement in 
the City of Johannesburg, as a case 
study. Adaptation can, therefore, be 
regarded as the ability to change 
internal organisational structures 
within informal settlements, in order 
to conform to what the authorities 
demand. This ability or characteristic 
is displayed in an environment 
of constant threats of demolition 
from authorities, hence the use of 
‘adaptive resistance’, for this study.
It is, therefore, clear that informal 
settlements can also be viewed from 
other perspectives. What can we 
learn about the internal mechanisms 
of these settlements in terms of 
mobilisation and organisation? 
How do they manage to keep 
growing amidst serious threats from 
authorities? This article argues that, 
although resistance is a key tool 
in ensuring that settlements grow, 
residents are aware that the state of 
any such settlement is often one of 
its major weaknesses. As a result, 
residents of informal settlements 
tend to copy ideas from planned 
areas, in order to improve layout and 
development outcomes in some form 
of ‘adaptive resistance’. This article 
examines the case of an informal 
settlement north of Mindolo North 
Municipal Township in the city of 
Kitwe, Zambia, simply referred to as 
Mindolo North informal settlement, 
which has gone through a number 
of waves of threats of demolition, 
despite its continued growth. Coupled 
with resistance, the settlement 
seems to be improving, by trying to 
increasingly resemble part of existing 
areas in its immediate vicinity and 
be accepted as such. The question 
then is: Why and how is it that the 
settlement is still growing amidst 
intense threats from authorities? 
What are the internal mechanisms 
that enable the settlement to adapt?
This article is pitched from an 
institutional economics perspective, 
which argues that each community 
has a way of organising itself through 
both formal and informal rules. ‘Rules’ 
from this perspective are defined as 
“rules of the game” (North, 1990: 3), 
the role of which is to constrain or 
enable human action in a particular 
environment. In the context of 
this article, informal settlements 
will emerge and organise around 
informal rules in an environment of 
weak formal rules. Thus, a vacuum 
in formal rules does not necessarily 
mean chaos and disorder; it also 
creates a space for informal rules 
to emerge and consolidate. In 
this sense, institutions provide the 
incentive structure within which 
human beings operate. The case of 
Mindolo North informal settlement 
becomes an ideal environment for 
exploring this theoretical perspective.
2. RESISTANCE AND 
ADAPTATION AS A 
TOOL FOR GROWTH
A number of studies (Akhmat & 
Khan, 2011; Msimang, 2017) have 
focused on the negative side of 
informal settlements and the need 
for their upgrading. However, 
this article argues that these 
settlements have grown through 
a process of resisting evictions 
and adapting to new information, 
in order to better organise internal 
activities and achieve better 
outcomes. It is noteworthy that 
similar terms have been used 
to refer to growth of informal 
settlements, such as “adaptive 
processes” (Jones, 2017: 6), “self-
perpetuating” or “self-planned” 
(Akhmat & Khan, 2011: 56), and “self-
organisation” (Eizenberg, 2018: 40), 
to describe processes where 
various actors and organisations 
undertake development independent 
of the State. A similar view 
is discussed in De Beer and 
Oranje (2019: 12), where it is argued 
that resistance and reconstruction 
from ‘small communities’ should 
be understood as an alternative 
to the ‘top-down’ approach in 
planning. In other words, De Beer 
and Oranje (2019: 12) advocate 
for making cities ‘from below’, 
similar to the ‘bottom-up’ approach 
discussed in Jones (2017: 6).
Resistance to eviction by the State 
can also be understood within an 
older concept of ‘right to the city’ by 
Henri Lefebvre (1996: 7) in 1968. 
This concept is both an idea and a 
slogan and is defined as “a demand 
... for a transformed and renewed 
access to urban life”. It thus falls 
within urban theory that describes 
the phenomenon of city formation. 
The reality, especially in the Global 
South, is that not all land within the 
jurisdiction of a municipality is clearly 
assigned a use and user, such that 
portions of land remain as public land 
or simply ‘free’. In the advent of rapid 
population increase and urbanisation, 
coupled with weak planning and 
administrative structures, this land 
becomes the battle ground for the 
less privileged and neglected of 
society who also lay claim to the 
city (Lefebvre, 1996; Attoh, 2011; 
Fieuw, 2011; Purcell, 2014).
Local authorities are often cited 
in many cases of planning failure 
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(Mabogunje, 1990; Massey, 2013; 
UN Habitat, 2013). A key reason 
for this accusation is that planning 
authorities have the mandate to 
prepare the development plan of 
a city or region and coordinate its 
implementation. One of the main 
activities in the implementation is 
monitoring development to ensure 
that the plan is executed as desired. 
However, by their nature, informal 
settlements are unplanned, meaning 
that they emerge and grow outside 
planning regulations. Literature often 
attributes the causes of informal 
settlements in most of the cities in the 
Global South to failure of planning 
rules. It should, however, be noted 
that planning rules are themselves 
institutions – formal institutions (Lai, 
Lorne, Chau & Ching, 2016: 230). 
Their role is to “enable or constrain” 
human action in the growth of cities. 
Because of failure of planning 
theory based on assumptions in 
a western environment, some 
scholars have started advocating for 
a different perspective in planning, 
one that takes into consideration 
specific characteristics of the 
Global South (Watson, 2014: 23). 
A case in point was the upgrading 
of Makhaza and New Rest informal 
settlements in Cape Town, which 
Massey (2013: 609) argued did 
not meet the needs of settlers with 
regard to their livelihood strategies. 
Similar thoughts were expressed 
earlier by Huchzermeyer (2004: 334) 
who argued for an approach 
that first looked at protecting 
residents’ constitutional rights 
before acting on the contravention 
of property and land-use laws.
Despite the absence of planning 
rules that accommodate them, 
marginalised communities will 
often find a way to ‘mobilise’ and 
organise, using a mixture of social 
norms and borrowed planning rules. 
Notwithstanding their seemingly 
chaotic appearance, the internal 
arrangements of these informal 
settlements are often organised and 
orderly through some form of “social 
ordering” (Nkurunziza, 2007: 509) 
defined as a “distinct pattern of 
organising society” (North, Wallis, 
Webb & Weingast, 2009: 2). Informal 
acquisition of land has thus been 
listed among various ways of land 
delivery in the vast majority of 
cities; others being allocation of 
public land, purchase through the 
land market, delivery of customary 
land through state-sanctioned 
means, delivery of customary land 
to members of a group, allocation 
by officials (usually political official), 
and purchase of customary land 
(Rakodi & Leduka, 2004: 1).
A number of studies show that self-
organising systems rely on structural 
principles, which help coordinate 
activities in the absence of the 
State (Giddens, 1984; Fuch, 2003). 
These are similar to principles 
used for the initial organisation of 
development activities in informal 
settlements. For instance, Munshifwa 
and Mooya (2016a: 480) argued for 
‘facilitative interaction’, defined as 
the constant engagement between 
formal and informal structure, 
as an important element in the 
consolidation of growth in informal 
settlements. The constant adaptation 
of these structural principles 
contributes to improved coordination 
and outcomes in these settlements. 
To understand the various 
developmental stages through which 
informal settlements grow, studies 
have identified at least three main 
stages, namely infancy, consolidation, 
and maturity (Sliuzas, Mboup & de 
Sherbinin, 2008; Sori, 2012). These 
stages are then linked, at a point in 
time, to specific outcomes such as 
building construction (size, materials, 
shape), nature of other objects 
(roads, health and other social 
facilities, open space), site conditions 
(location in the urban areas, slope, 
vegetation, natural hazards), and the 
slum development process. ‘Infancy’ 
is defined as the initial occupancy 
stage, during which public amenities 
and services are non-existent 
(Sori, 2012: 5). The consolidation 
stage is the intermediate stage, 
which sees fast expansion of the 
settlement, while intensifying on 
construction (Sori, 2012: 5). ‘Maturity’ 
or ‘saturation’ is the point at which 
the land expansion stops, while 
intensification on the settlement 
increases (Sori, 2012: 6). Although 
Sliuzas et al. (2008) and Sori (2012) 
concentrated the definitions on land 
coverage and intensity, these stages 
can equally be linked to changes over 
time in other development outcomes.
This article hypothesises that the key 
ingredient in moving from one stage 
to the next is the settlers’ amount 
of resistance and adaptive ability. 
This is then reflected in changes 
over time in development outcomes 
such as building construction, 
accessibility, and provision of 
health and other social facilities. 
The informal development process 
is then underpinned by a local 
institutional structure of rules and 
organisations (Figure 1), similar to 
the one perceived by Fitchett (2014).
3. STUDY AREA
Mindolo North informal settlement 
(Figure 2), first established in 
1979, is situated on the northern 
end of Kitwe as an extension to 
Figure 1: Development process of informal settlements
Source: Author
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Mindolo North Municipal Township. 
At the time of the 2014 study, the 
settlement was still in its formative 
state or infancy, with raging public 
debates on whether it should be 
allowed to exist or not. It covered 
an approximate area of 62 hectares 
with an estimated population of 
3 000 and 550 households, giving 
it a population density of 48 people 
per hectare and household density 
of 5.5 persons per household. During 
the survey, it was found that Mindolo 
North consisted of two distinct 
spatial areas, namely Mindolo North 
Municipal Township and Mindolo 
North informal settlement. The latter 
also had two sections. The first 
section was the area closest to the 
formal township, where land was 
allocated by Mindolo Ward Residents 
Development Committee (RDC), 
and the latter section was either 
allocated by political officials during 
the 2010/2011 election campaigns or 
self-allocated (invaded) by residents 
on public and private land. Property 
rights in the area are thus informal. 
Where necessary, this distinction will 
be used during data presentation 
and analysis, in order to provide 
more insight into the differences in 
perception between those allocated 
by RDC and the rest of the residents.
From 2008 to 2018, residents of the 
settlement experienced numerous 
clashes with the law. Threats of 
eviction are omnipresent, as the 
Kitwe City Council (KCC) makes 
several incursions into the area to 
demolish structures. During the time 
of the household survey (April 2014), 
the local authority issued threats 
via radio, television and print 
media to demolish the settlement. 
The local authority contended that 
3 000 plots were sold illegally in 
Mindolo North and that 8 people had 
been arrested as a result of such 
illegal sales (The Zambian, 2014). 
By 5 June 2014, 32 residents had 
been arrested (Lusaka Times, 2014),1 
over 600 housing structures were 
demolished by the local authorities, 
and residents relocated. The current 
status is that these houses have 
1 A visual inspection by the author on 22 July 
2014 revealed that all the houses, except for 
those allocated by RDC, were razed down.
been rebuilt and the settlement has 
grown beyond the 2014 boundaries. 
Many new houses have been 
erected, including the use of more 
permanent building materials, 
thus showing evidence not only of 
resistance, but also of adaptation.
4. RESEARCH
Literature (Rakodi & Leduka, 2004; 
Nkurunziza, 2007; Nassar & 
Elsayed, 2017) points to a shift not 
only in accepting informal settlements 
as part of the reality in most of the 
developing countries, but also that 
their way of organising may be 
useful. It is, therefore, important 
that, in the process of helping these 
settlements improve, authorities 
do not ‘throw out the baby with the 
bath water’. This study focused on 
understanding the operations of 
internal mechanisms within these 
settlements with regard to the initial 
set-up of the settlement, rules 
of plot arrangements, sizes and 
allocation, and the implementation 
and control structure used. 
The case study of Mindolo North 
informal settlement was selected 
for investigating these mechanisms, 
including specific measurable 
parameters of land coverage, 
house completion, and promises of 
property rights and documentation. 
It combines quantitative data 
(survey questionnaires) and life 
story experiences of settlers 
(interviews) to examine tangible 
development outcomes.
4.1 Data collection
Data for this article was collected 
as part of a bigger research project. 
The project was a comparative 
study of three settlements in 
Kitwe (Figure 2), namely Mindolo 
North informal settlement 
(illegal settlement), Chipata 
Figure 2: Location of Mindolo North informal settlement
Source: Adapted from Google Maps (2013)
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(semi-legal settlement), and Ipusukilo 
(a legalised settlement) (Munshifwa 
& Mooya, 2016a; 2016b). 
First, household surveys were 
undertaken over a period of seven 
months (from January 2014 to 
August 2014). Households were 
selected based on random sampling 
whereby the interviewers skipped 
two houses in between; that is, 
every third house was selected. 
The surveys were targeted at 
heads of households, although in 
the absence of husbands in male-
headed households, wives were 
interviewed instead. The collection 
of data involved the administration of 
704 questionnaires, comprising 152 
for Mindolo North, 271 for Chipata, 
and 281 for Ipusukilo. The survey 
questionnaire consisted of five 
sections. Section one obtained 
biographical data; sections three to 
five set pre-set tickbox questions 
on physical and infrastructure 
developments; property rights 
and acquisition; property market 
information, as well as property 
contracts and enforcement. 
In order to understand the deep-
seated beliefs, norms and customs, 
with specific focus on property rights, 
mechanisms and processes, as well 
as the interaction between formal and 
informal systems, in-depth semi-
structured interviews were held in the 
three settlements in November 2014 
(Bryman, 2004). These interviews 
were conducted with 10 officers 
from KCC and 24 residents in the 
three settlements (8 per settlement 
who had lived in the settlement for 
at least 5 years). Thus, a total of 34 
individuals were interviewed. In-depth 
interviews targeted senior residents 
and local officials such as chairmen, 
RDC officials and Block secretaries, 
who were able to recount the genesis 
and growth of these settlements. 
The interview schedule consisted 
of 15 open-ended questions with 
the aim to understand the KCC’s 
role in the physical development 
of these low-income settlements 
and to obtain the life histories of 
residents from the point of settling in 
the settlement to the present day.
Secondary data was also 
collected from published and 
unpublished documents.
4.2 Sample size
In Mindolo North informal settlement, 
with an estimated population of 3 000 
people, a sample size of 704 people 
completed questionnaires. The Krejcie 
and Morgan (1970: 608) table for 
sample size formulas indicates that, 
for a population equal to or over 3 000, 
a sample size of 704 is valid.
4.3 Data analysis and 
interpretation of findings
The SPSS computer program was 
used for analysis of the 2014 socio-
economic characteristics of Mindolo 
North informal settlement, where 
the percentages of responses were 
reported. The Somers’ d test was 
used to measure the existence of 
(P-value) and how strong (R-value) 
the relationships were between 
the socio-economic characteristics 
and development outcomes 
(Newson, 2002: 46). Somers’ d uses a 
scale from -1 to 1, where 1 signifies a 
perfect positive relationship, -1 signifies 
a perfect negative relationship, and 0 
signifies no overall ordinal relationship.
Content analysis (selective 
coding) was used to analyse 
and group components that 
support development outcomes 
mentioned in the in-depth 
interviews (Table 2). To understand 
the changes in development 
outcomes, the 2014 survey results, 
as a basis for understanding 
socio-economic characteristics of 
Mindolo North informal settlement, 
were compared to the 2018 
survey results of the KCC.




The study was perceived with the 
understanding that socio-economic 
factors partly impact on the ability of 
residents to compete in the formal 
market, thus resorting to settling in 
informal settlements. The survey 
revealed (Figures 3 to 6) that 35% 
of the respondents were male and 
65% were female. Out of these, 89% 
were “owners” and 11% tenants. 
In terms of age, the study revealed 
that 47% of the respondents were 
aged between 31 and 40 years. 
Figure 4:  Employment statusFigure 3:  Age of respondents
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Cumulatively, 77% were aged 
40 years or below. This implies that 
most of the residents are young, 
and possibly also unemployed. 
Further investigations confirmed that 
52% were unemployed and 33% 
were self-employed; a cumulative 
total of 85%. The study found that 
only 6% were formally employed.
The Somers’ d measure was used 
for ordinal-level data to further 
explore this relationship. The results 
showed a weak positive relationship 
with a value of 0.042, using age as 
a dependent variable. For Mindolo 
North informal settlement, this result 
implies that the vast majority of the 
unemployed people in the settlement 
are young; most of them are aged 
below 40 years and unemployed/
self-employed (Figures 3 and 4). 
This further means that providing 
gainful employment for young 
people will empower them in such 
a way that they would be able to 
pay for plots through a legitimate 
process of land acquisition.
The analysis of income and 
expenditure strengthens the above 
findings. Statistics showed that 47% 
of the respondents earned K5002 or 
less per month, thus confirming the 
low-income status of residents in the 
informal settlement (Figures 5 and 6). 
Similarly, 46% of the respondents 
earned K500 or less. The level of 
income is also reflected in expenditure 
statistics, showing that the majority of 
the respondents spent K500 or less.
2 Approximately USD38.00 per month at the 
current exchange rate of K13.00 to USD1.
5.2 Changes in 
development outcomes
The emergence and growth of 
Mindolo North informal settlement 
can be analysed within three phases: 
prior to 2011 (mostly allocated 
by the Resident Development 
Committee [RDC]); from 2011 to 
2013 (allocated by Movement for 
Multi-party Democracy [MMD] 
officials), and post-2013, mostly 
through self-allocation. 
As argued by Nkurunziza (2007), 
Munshifwa and Mooya (2016a), 
informal mechanisms developed 
within informal settlements to 
provide the structural principles 
upon which they emerge and 
grow. This article focuses on 
developments as outcomes of these 
structural principles (Giddens, 1984; 
Fuch, 2003). Despite their origin, 
informal settlements are argued 
to provide services, including self-
planning or organisation, in the 
absence of the State. Other tangible 
outcomes are also noticeable in these 
settlements which have a relationship 
with strengthening possession/
rights on land. For instance, this 
is noted in the change of building 
materials from temporary to more 
permanent, as one moves from the 
newly settled (infancy stage) to the 
old (maturity stage); emergence 
of a land and property market and 
some form of order in plot sizes 
and layout. With this in mind, the 
remainder of this article compares 
findings of the 2018 survey by KCC, 
against development outcome noted 
during the 2014 survey. Three main 
parameters, namely land coverage, 
house completions, and promises of 
property rights or documentation, are 
isolated for this comparison. Besides 
these three main parameters, 
findings from in-depth interviews of 
2014 highlighted the local institutional 
and organisational structures 
as the underpinning support for 
current development outcomes.
5.2.1 Land coverage
Occupation and development of land 
in Mindolo North informal settlement 
can be categorised into three main 
parts (see Figures 7 and 8), namely 
Block A (allocated by the RDC and 
can rightly be called “matured”); B 
(allocated by ruling party officials and 
in the consolidation stage), and C 
(self-allocated and still in its infancy). 
Block A is the initial occupation 
and covers an approximate area 
of 47 hectares. Some settlers have 
been in this area for over 26 years. 
However, in the advent of the 2011 
presidential and parliamentary 
elections, Mindolo North experienced 
a second wave of occupation 
spearheaded by ruling party officials. 
This area covers approximately 
86 hectares. These two parts were 
separated by a large graded road. 
Much of the demolitions of June 
2014 affected Block B and a small 
part of Block C. The 2014 survey 
reviewed that 4% of the settlers 
were allocated by RDC officials, 21% 
by ruling party officials, and 75% 
simply squatted on vacant land.
Figure 5:  Total monthly income Figure 6:  Total monthly expenditure
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Figure 7: Block A allocated by RDC and Block B allocated by Ruling Party officials
Source:  Adapted from Google Earth, 2019
Figure 8: Block C illegally squatted (self-allocated)
Source: Adapted from Google Earth, 2019
The September 2018 survey by 
KCC revealed a growing Mindolo 
North informal settlement. After the 
2014 demolitions, the settlement 
experienced a third wave of 
occupation (mainly comprising 
Block C), such that, by 2018, much 
of the remaining private land of 
approximately 114 hectares had 
been covered (Figure 8).This has 
brought the total occupied land to 
260 hectares. This area was initially 
planned for the development of a 
USD200 million Copperbelt City Mall 
by TGP Properties Limited, a joint 
venture between HBW Group of 
South Africa and Phoenix Materials of 
Zambia.3 While it can be argued that 
this increase in land coverage can be 
3 Lusaka Voice, 2013. Construction of Zambia’s 
largest mall to start soon. 
attributed to laxity by monitoring and 
enforcement agencies responsible 
for settlement administration and 
planning, the resistance of settlers 
has also played a big part.
5.2.2 House completions
The 2014 survey reported that 
550 plots were at various stages 
of development, with 440 fully 
developed. However, the 2018 
survey by KCC revealed that 
581 houses are complete (an 
increase of 32%), 597 are incomplete 
and built to window level, while 
another 673 are at foundation level. 
KCC further revealed that 1 477 
plots remain undeveloped, bringing 
the total number of plots in the area 
to 3 328, an indication of a rapid 
construction rate between 2014 and 
2018 (Table 1). Although population 
figures were not yet available at 
the time of the 2018 survey, this 
article argues that extrapolating 
the population using the household 
density of 5.5 per household 
(Table 1) would show that Mindolo 
North informal settlement will have 
a total population of approximately 
17 500 when fully settled, making 
it one of the largest informal 
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settlements in Kitwe.4 This increase 
in the number of completed houses 
confirms the increase in land 
coverage discussed in 5.2.1.
5.2.3 Property rights 
and documentation
The rapid rate of occupation 
in Mindolo North can also be 
attributed to promises of official 
offer letters by the Council to the 
vast majority of settlers in the area. 
In September 2018, government, 
through the Provincial Minister’s 
office, assured settlers that 2 000 
letters would be issued to legalise 
their occupation.5 By contrast, in 
2014, only 44 residents claimed to 
have had some document issued 
by RDC as proof of occupation, 
while 506 had no single document. 
Such pronouncements signal 
to settlers that their occupation 
is slowly being recognised as 
legitimate, with potential to 
spur physical development.
5.2.4 Interaction between 
institutions and 
organisations
Content analysis (selective coding) 
from the in-depth interview results 
shows the components that support 
4 After Ipusukilo (now legalised) and Mulenga, 
the two largest informal settlements in the city 
of Kitwe.
5 A recent check at KCC revealed that no offer 
letters have yet been issued.
development outcomes through 
the interaction between institutions 
and organisations. Table 2 provides 
further information on modes of 
acquisition, expenditure towards 
improvements, building materials, 
spatial arrangements, leadership, 
and interaction with local authorities.
A number of conclusions can be 
drawn from these narratives, which, 
in turn, support survey findings. First, 
there is a difference in the length 
of stay between the three blocks, 
with residents in Block A (RDC 
allocated) having been in the area 
longer than the other two. This has 
implications for the confidence of 
settlers, the materials used, and the 
perceptions on land rights. The 2014 
survey revealed that 90% of the 
settlers had been in the settlement 
for 5 years or less (mostly from 
Blocks B and C), while the other 
10% had been there for longer than 
5 years. A further scrutiny of these 
results revealed that there was a 
relationship between construction 
materials and the length of stay in 
the settlement, with the Somers’ d 
scale showing 0.118 (a weak positive 
relationship). The implication is 
that the older area will have more 
durable houses than the newly 
settled parts. Furthermore, the level 
of threats of the local authority also 
influences the materials used by 
residents. For instance, because 
RDC allotees felt less threatened 
by the local authorities, they were 
able to invest more in their buildings. 
Hence, the predominant use of mud 
bricks and corrugated iron roofing is 
also a result of threats from the local 
authority and age of the settlement.
Secondly, uncoordinated land use 
is one of the key characteristics 
of informal settlements. While not 
using the formal system of planning, 
settlers are able to agree on the 
apportionment of the land, even in 
the absence of State machinery. 
From the narratives, it was clear that 
they had an idea of “planning”, as 
they apportioned plots. As argued 
by Hayek (1945: 521), any form of 
planning is based on knowledge, 
regardless of who is doing the 
planning. Thus, despite their low 
educational status, residents had 
an idea of measurement of plots 
and layouts. Statistics revealed 
that plot sizes averaged 395 
square metres (with the category 
of 300m2 being considered as 
falling into the low-cost category 
of plots in local planning jargon).
Thirdly, it was clear that secondary 
transfers of plots were also occurring 
as evidence of an emerging land 
market. For instance, although 48% 
of the respondents agreed to have 
recently invaded the land, 41% 
claimed that they had bought from 
someone. In addition, the local social 
network of friends and relatives 
was found to be important for both 
communication and acquisition 
of land. It can thus be concluded 
that market forces are always 
omnipresent in these settlements, 
and that any indication of stability will 
result in secondary transfers, whether 
rights on land are confirmed or not.
Fourthly, occupation of land is 
organised via a form of institutional 
structure comprising a committee 
headed by a chairman, based on 
agreed local rules on assigning 
land uses (plots and passages) 
and apportionment of land 
parcels. The indication is that 
settlers are working from some 
knowledge base that enables them 
to “plan” uses and allocations 
around some measurement.
Table 1: Development outcomes for Mindolo North 
informal settlement 2014 and 2018
Parameters 2014a 2018
Population 3,000 17,523c
Households (est.) 550 3328b
Household density 5.5 5.5a
Population density (persons per hectare) 48 67c
Construction material – mud bricks 78%
Construction material – concrete blocks 19%
Complete house 440 581b
Incomplete houses – window level - 597b
Incomplete houses – foundation - 673b
Undeveloped land - 1477
No documentation 506
RDC 44
Offer letters - 2000b
Area coverage (ha) 62 260d
Source: a2014 survey by author; b2018 survey by KCC (unpublished);1 cProjected by author; 
dGoogle Earth estimate
1 This was also reported in the Daily Nation, Wednesday, 26 September 2018 (Daily Nation, 2018).
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Table 2: Summary of in-depth interviews
Themes Responses Interpretation/Explanation
Modes of acquisition
FS is a 33-year-old man who moved into Mindolo North Municipal Township 
from Chingola in 1989. He bought his land from someone selling. Mindolo 
Ward RDC office was involved in change of “ownership”.
PK moved into the settlement in 2012. He narrated that he moved into 
Mindolo North two years ago, that is in 2010. He claimed that he bought the 
plot from someone.
JN moved into the settlement in 2011. He claimed that he was allocated land 
by ruling party officials at the time. He was evicted in June 2014.
JP bought the land in 2007. He paid K5 000 to buy the plot, but the building 
was done over a period of time.
ZO (38 years old). I moved into Mindolo North in 2011 and illegally squatted 
on the land.
The main means of acquiring land in the settlements 
were: allocation through the RDC; buying from the 
informal market; allocation through ruling party officials,
With the role of RDC in land allocation curtailed, 
squatting and buying from the informal market have 
remained the two main modes of acquiring land.
Investment
FS claimed that he spent roughly K35 million [now K35 0001], incrementally. 
PK spent K5 million at the time [K5 0002 now].
ZO was not sure how much was spent on building.
PJ estimated that he had spent roughly K80 million [K80 0003 now] to build 
the house.
A number of improvements such as main dwelling 
houses have been done with varying amounts spent.
A recent survey by KCC revealed that settlers are 
now building more permanent structures, especially in 
Blocks A and B. Block C is still dominated by temporary 
structures, an indication that Blocks A and B have 
moved to the second stage of consolidation, while 
Block C is still in infancy.
Building construction
JN built in mud blocks and iron sheets (Block B). The reason given was that 
the local authority was always threatening to remove them from the area.
FS built with concrete blocks (Block A). Recently replaced iron sheets.
JP built with concrete blocks (Block A). Still improving the house.
ZO built a two-roomed house with mud blocks (Block C). House demolished 
in 2014.
In order to avoid a huge risk when demolition takes 
place, settlers in infancy stage build with more 
temporary material such as mud blocks and iron 
sheets. As they feel more entitled to the land in the 
consolidation stage, more permanent materials such 
as concrete blocks are then used. 
The design of houses also starts changing in the 
consolidation stage from two-roomed houses to more 
conventional urban designs.
Spatial arrangements 
FS revealed that a gravel road marked the demarcation between the legal 
(Block A) and the illegal part. Further reported that all the houses across that 
road were either allocated by MMD officials, or residents just took the land 
for themselves.
ZO revealed the fact that when they first arrived in Mindolo North, they 
agreed among themselves that each one would get a plot of 15 x 20 metres 
and then leave roads of 6 metres. They formed a committee and nominated 
a chairperson whose role was to assist in the demarcation of land and 
resolving disputes, especially on boundaries. 
JP noted that, although they consider themselves legal occupants, the 
planning authority did not control what they built. But JP was quick to state 
that most of the houses in that area (Block A) were already complete with 
settlers only doing improvements or making extensions. He further stated 
that most of the people in that area could afford to build with concrete blocks; 
that is why the standard of houses was better than on the other side (Blocks 
B and C).
Despite the seemingly haphazard layout of the vast 
majority of informal settlements, interviews with settlers 
often revealed some form of spatial arrangements, in a 
way mimicking the formal part of the city. As revealed 
during these interviews, settlers had ideas on specific 
amounts of land to allocate to each settler including the 
need to reserve land for access. 
Despite claimed legal status through RDC allocations, 
residents in Block A were still not subjected to urban 
planning controls, and yet their houses were better 
built than in the other two areas.
Leadership
PK on the RDC land was not aware of the Chairman. He pointed out that the 
Chairman was only on the “other side”, meaning on land allocated by party 
officials and self-allocated.
JN pointed out that leadership was provided by the Chairperson; however, 
the local authorities did not recognise this person. His role also included 
resolving disputes especially among settlers.
ZO – Leadership during allocation was provided by the Chairperson of a 
committee formed by settlers. The Chairperson showed settlers the corners 
of their plots, but it was the responsibility of each settler to ensure that 
boundaries were marked to avoid disputes with the neighbours. 
It was clear that there was a difference in perception 
between those allocated by the RDC (Block A) and 
those on the other two blocks. Because of the nature 
of their occupation, settlers in Blocks B and C had 
to nominate their own leadership, independent of 
government structures. These local structures are 
key to maintaining order and stability in informal 
settlements in the absence of State authority.
Interaction with local 
authorities
PK narrated that the only time they heard the local authority speak to them 
directly was when they drove through to warn residents about the planned 
demolition exercise.
ZO also confirmed the fact that no meetings were held between the local 
authority and the residents. However, ZO further pointed out that the 
Chairman did attempt to have meetings with the local authorities. These were 
turned down most of the time.
Although formally the local authority did not recognise 
the leadership in the settlement, the study found that, 
informally, chairpersons provided a bridge between 
the formal and informal structures for communication 
purposes.
(Footnotes)
1 Approximately USD 2,692.00 at K13.00 per USD
2 Approximately USD 385.00 at K13.00 per USD. 
3 Approximately USD 6,154.00 at K13.00 per USD
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Finally, resistance and adaptation 
are important tools for the growth of 
informal settlements. As alluded to 
earlier, in June 2014, a combined 
team of local council representatives 
and Zambian Police moved into the 
area and demolished houses built on 
illegally acquired land. The majority of 
these houses were on Block B, while 
Block C was still in the formative 
stage. The 2018 survey by the KCC 
not only revealed re-occupation of 
Block B, but also consolidation of 
development of, and extension to 
Block C, increasing the coverage 
from 62 hectares (Block A and partly 
B) to 260 hectares (Blocks A, B and 
C). The number of completed houses, 
from 440 (2014) to 581 (2018), 
is another indication of growth. 
The process in-between has been 
one of contestation and struggles 
between settlers and local authorities, 
culminating in the recent promises 
of normalising the occupation. 
This shows the settlers’ clear will 
and purpose to be part of the city.
6. CONCLUSION
The entry point for this study was 
that, due to rapid urbanisation, 
planning systems in most of the 
developing countries are failing, 
resulting in the rapid growth of 
informal settlements. In addition, 
even in cases where local authorities 
make efforts to prevent this growth, 
the shear resistance of settlers 
in these areas makes it difficult. 
The study noted that marginalised 
groups of society, mostly young and 
unemployed, make claims to the 
city for the various conveniences 
it provides. Where urban systems 
fail to accommodate them, they will 
fight for space in whichever way they 
can. One of the key means used 
is forceful occupation of any land 
deemed vacant, private or public. 
Based on some knowledge and a 
mix of social norms and borrowed 
statutory rules, they “plan” and build 
“their own city”. After a long period of 
struggles, many of these settlements 
ultimately received the approval of 
the State, resulting in their permanent 
establishment, as is the case for 
Mindolo North informal settlement. 
The study noted three important 
stages in this development process, 
namely infancy (initial occupation), 
consolidation (characterised by 
rapid expansion of land coverage 
and construction), and maturity 
(intensification of construction within 
the occupied space). This whole 
process is underpinned by a 
local institutional and governance 
structure of informal rules, norms and 
interaction with formal structures.
As observed in the case of Mindolo 
North informal settlement, three key 
parameters such as land coverage, 
house completions, and property 
rights and documentation revealed 
the rapid growth of the settlement. 
The study revealed that between 
2014 and 2018, the settlement had 
experienced an increase in land 
coverage from 62 ha to 260 ha, 
completed (including rebuilding) 
houses from 440 to 581, and 
received promises of offer letters 
for 2 000 settlers. Over the same 
period, the settlement had seen the 
construction of more permanent 
houses of concrete blocks, all these 
being clear indications of a maturing 
settlement. However, this has come 
after many struggles with local 
authorities, which saw demolition of 
about 600 houses in June 2014.
This study is limited in that it 
is based on one case study. 
Nonetheless, it points to a number 
of relationships that need to be 
investigated in a larger comparative 
study. For instance: What is the 
relationship between level of threats 
and durability of building materials? 
What is the relationship between 
age of a settlement and durability of 
building materials? What is the role 
of tacit knowledge in the building 
of informal settlements? These 
issues need further investigation.
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